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One of the most central concepts of Adorno’s aesthetic theory is that of mimesis. It is, 
perhaps, surprising to find this concept – so deeply associated with a debate in ancient 
philosophy – employed in the context of a new theory of aesthetic modernism, one 
conceived within the intellectual space of critical theory. And it is not only its archaic 
associations that appear to make it an unlikely way of capturing the specific properties 
of modernism. Mimesis carries with it connotations of imitation and representation. It 
has something to do with art’s supposed mission, that of copying reality. Yet these are 
the traditional norms of aesthetic production that modernism self-consciously and 
often polemically repudiated. Mimesis, however, is an evolving concept. As Jacques 
Derrida notes: “The whole history of the interpretation of the arts of letters has moved 
and been transformed within the diverse logical possibilities opened up by the concept 
of mimesis.”1 
 
Adorno argues that art has a continuing engagement with reality, and he radically 
reconceives the notion of mimesis in order to explain the distinctive nature of that 
engagement. His new conception of mimesis provides an explanation of the kind of 
expression of reality of which modernist artworks are capable. Modernist expression 
is not, according to Adorno, imitation. His claim is that expression, in this context, 
consists in giving aesthetic form to the form of social reality itself. As we shall see, 
for Adorno form – not content, image or representations – is the key property of what 
constitutes the specifically aesthetic construction – the mimesis – of that reality. As 
Peter Uwe Hohendahl explains: for Adorno “modern works articulate, more 
poignantly than do historical narratives or philosophical systems (such as 
existentialism), the horrors of the twentieth century. Only through their extreme 
formal construction do the works of Kafka or Joyce or Beckett become legitimate 
witnesses to this horror2 
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The case of Kafka stands at the very centre of Adorno’s articulation of modernist 
mimesis. His main study of Kafka is the long and complex essay “Notes on Kafka” 
(1953), which he republished in the collection Prisms (1955). But numerous 
references to Kafka are found throughout his unfinished masterpiece, Aesthetic 
Theory (first published in 1970) and in the four part collection of essays, Notes to 
Literature. From his correspondence with Walter Benjamin (on the subject of 
Benjamin’s essay, “Franz Kafka”), we can also see how deeply Adorno had been 
considering Kafka’s work from the very beginning of his professional career.3 Adorno 
claims that historical “processes” are found as “ciphers” in Kafka’s work (P 252).4 
This might seem to say that Adorno takes Kafka to be a social commentator who 
sought to say something about history. Although Adorno is aware of Kafka’s political 
standpoints he does not take them to be determinative of the content of Kafka’s 
fiction. Kafka qua writer was engaged in a purely aesthetic activity which 
nevertheless unintentionally but necessarily achieves a mimesis of social reality. As 
Adorno writes, “Kafka’s works protected themselves against the deadly aesthetic 
error of equating the philosophy that an author pumps into a work with its 
metaphysical substance. Were this so, the work of art would be stillborn; it would 
exhaust itself in what it says and would not unfold itself in time” (P 247). Adorno’s 
reading of Kafka, then, is not an effort to find an implicit theory or illustrated 
examples of philosophical insights in the texts. As Walter H. Sokel puts it, “Kafka’s 
reader, Adorno maintained, should not rush to look for the ‘meaning’ of over-arching 
images by translating them into cultural concepts ready at hand but external to the 
text.”5 Adorno does not “read off” a Kafkaesque philosophy from the literary work. 
He adopts Benjamin’s description of Kafka’s works as “damaged parables” (AT 
126)6: damaged in that they constantly suggest complexes of metaphors, metaphors 
that cannot be unlocked. The key to the interpretation of Kafka’s work, Adorno says, 
“has been stolen” (P 246). Each work invites decoding yet “none will permit it” (P 
246). When Adorno speaks about Kafka he is not attempting, then, to tell us what the 
works are really all about: the hidden meanings that he can bring to our attention. He 
treats them as works of art with their own irreducible integrity. The philosophical 
claims he makes about Kafka’s work, as we shall see, relate to the forms they 
distinctively bear within the historical conditions of modernity. The interpretative 
claims about Kafka’s works that Adorno develops emerge through an examination of 
their aesthetic dimensions. The aesthetic dimensions are primarily, for Adorno, a 
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work’s formal properties. Adorno thinks of the artist as placed within an ever 
changing historical context in which form must constantly be reinvented. This appears 
to be self-evident from the perspective of the history of art. Where the interest of 
critical theory enters, however, is through Adorno’s contention that art is the 
expression of social reality. The development of form is a response to societal 
evolution. The expression that art achieves cannot be translated into purely theoretical 
terms. Because, then, art provides us with a distinctive view of social reality 
considerations of the aesthetic dimension turn out to be significant in directing critical 
theory to the very phenomenon of social reality. It is important to note – as the 
analysis to be offered here cannot do justice to it – that Adorno’s conclusions about 
the general mimetic qualities of Kafka’s work are rooted in a broad range of specific 
details in the texts of Kafka (principally the three novels and several of the longer 
stories). 
 
There are two distinguishable senses of mimesis in Adorno’s discussions of Kafka 
(they may already be apparent). The first relates to the mimetic content of artworks: 
what they express (“ciphers”). The second is what Adorno calls the “mimetic 
comportment” of the artist: the process of creativity. Both of these dimensions will be 
examined below. The concept of mimesis sits within an inter-dependent network of 
ideas in Adorno’s aesthetic theory, and it is intelligible only within that network. So 
before looking at the details of Adorno’s enthusiastic appraisal of Kafka we need to 
appreciate, even briefly, what Adorno means by the autonomy of art, aesthetic 
authenticity, mimesis and the relationship between art and social criticism. 
 
Art and Autonomy 
Adorno holds that authentic works of art in modernity are characterized by their 
autonomy from the life-processes of society. To ascribe autonomy to art is not to 
claim that it has some kind of existence outside history or society. The matter of 
autonomy is not a metaphysical one. The complexity of Adorno’s thesis consists in its 
claim for a very specific relationship of art to society: art is autonomous from the 
processes of reification that, according to the critical tradition to which he belongs, 
disfigures the social world. A corollary of a work’s autonomy is, for Adorno, its 
authenticity. An autonomous work is authentic because it has been formed without 
regard to the requirements of society: the social norms of communication or of 
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purpose and usefulness. “The more authentic the works, the more they follow what is 
objectively required, the object’s consistency, and this is always universal,” Adorno 
writes (AT 201). They are guided by an aesthetic necessity – “objectivity” – rather 
than by the purposes imposed on social production generally. A work of art that is 
oriented towards a social purpose is therefore inauthentic: it has, according to 
Adorno’s theory, constrained itself – thereby losing its autonomy – in order to give 
that purpose aesthetic form. It is characterized, Adorno contends, by heteronomy in 
that its meaning must conform to an idea antecedently established outside the work. 
 
Adorno, as we shall see, valorizes Kafka’s works as mimetic expressions of reified 
life, as “a cryptogram of a decaying capitalist social order.”7 We need to be clear 
about what the concept of reification means to him. Adorno holds that individuals 
become reified by living within the conditions of contemporary capitalism. Two 
essential features of that form of society are instrumental rationality and capitalism. 
Both of these, it seems, mutually sustain each other. In order to be an efficient agent 
of capitalism one must have internalized the “rules of exchange,” and these rules 
shape the general consciousness of the individual. By exchange Adorno means the 
system in which all phenomena – things, labour, time – become translatable into a 
pecuniary value. He calls this “equivalence.” Once made equivalent in this sense 
phenomena can be bought or sold for the universal token, money. The manipulative 
rationality which is required for the effective operation of exchange – the capacity to 
translate the diverse objects of the world into fiscally equivalent phenomena – informs 
rationality as a whole, since it is the prevailing social rationality. The everyday belief 
in this exchange system is not voluntaristic. Individuals are inducted, from their 
earliest experiences, into the distinctive form of social behaviour characteristic of an 
exchange society. A growing capacity to translate everything into abstract value – 
what it is “worth” – comes to determine individuals’ perceptions of wider reality. 
Adorno writes: “Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes the dissimilar 
comparable by reducing it to abstract quantities.”8 
 
A common personality is generated by the total system of exchange. Together, 
individuals form a network which sustains the system that determines them. As 
Adorno writes: “What really makes society a social entity, what constitutes it both 
conceptually and in reality, is the relationship of exchange which binds together 
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virtually all the people participating in this kind of society.”9 The exchange principle, 
then, is not a pragmatic option, but one with quasi-natural compellingness. It becomes 
a piece of second nature to us, as the way in which self-preservation is to be pursued. 
As Adorno puts it: “The form of the total system requires everyone to respect the law 
of exchange if he does not wish to be destroyed, irrespective of whether profit is his 
subjective motivation or not.”10 Society is a totality in that it integrates all individual 
moments of life into it: each moment bears the determinations of the totality. A world 
so organized can sustain and reproduce itself because of the acquiescence of those 
within it: they accede to the imperatives of exchange, though they do not seek 
justifications for those imperatives. These imperatives govern life, they must be 
followed, yet they are antagonistic to human flourishing. Robert W. Witkin describes 
the pertinence of Kafka to Adorno for the diagnosis of this kind of society: “On a 
literary plane, Franz Kafka conveyed, with chilling effect, in The Castle and The 
Trial, the nightmare of a legal-rational existence bereft of spiritual life, of a 
subjectivity that filled out empty forms as its historical core.”11 It is for this reason 
that Adorno thinks of the social totality as irrational: it constantly acts against 
individuals who, at the same time, seek no explanation for its apparent necessity and 
its demanding norms. Kafka – and Proust – perceived this “necessity,” Adorno writes, 
“in something that is wholly contingent, a necessity that can be perceived only 
negatively.”12 
 
Given that Adorno holds that the social totality pervasively influences consciousness, 
it might seem that art can be autonomous only when it is detached from history. That 
is, if the phenomena of exchange and reified life are everywhere, art – if it is at all 
possible – must operate outside the space of everywhere. And that looks like a 
metaphysical conception of art, after all. Adorno does indeed see art as free of the 
forms of determination that characterize reified life. At the same time, though, 
autonomous art draws its content from society: from this society in which “damaged 
life,” as he famously calls it in Minima Moralia, prevails. In that respect artworks are, 
he believes, socio-historical phenomena. They are not, at the same time, typical social 
products. Adorno understands aesthetic experience – from creativity, to performance 
and experience – to operate in a space that it not yet inhabited by reification. It 
expresses history, but is not, because it is free, reducible to historical processes. Its 
6 
form of expression – its mimetic property – has somehow eluded the reach of 
reification. Adorno offers no account of art’s special capacity to resist reification. 
 
Art’s autonomous position is frequently explained contrastively by Adorno: in 
conventional non-aesthetic expression, reified life is represented in reified ways. 
Social processes are reproduced through reified forms of communication. We might 
see this in the rather extreme case of TV “soap opera” dramas. These dramas imitate 
the apparently everyday events of society. They seek to engage their consumers with 
the would-be slice of life of society that they present, and consumers will enjoy the 
dramas only in so far as they identify with their plots and characters. These dramas 
are intensifications of experiences already known to and thematized by the audiences: 
they are not unsettling and the consumer is drawn passively into their narratives. They 
are “realistic” in so far as they meet their consumers’ expectations of what reality 
essentially looks like. Modernist work, by contrast, endeavours to break the pattern of 
identification between the work and expectations. Adorno addresses this specific 
accomplishment in Kafka: “Among Kafka’s presuppositions,” he writes, “not the least 
is that the contemplative relation between text and reader is shaken to its very roots” 
(P 246). And again, in radical contrast to the passive consumption which sustains 
heteronomous work, Adorno sees Kafka’s works as breaking down the “distance 
between themselves and their victim” (P 246), the victim being the reader. The 
experience of the reader – Adorno speaks of the agitation of “feelings” (P 246) – is 
that of ceasing simply to observe what happens to the characters as the dreadful 
worlds they inhabit begin to become the reader’s own. 
 
The critique of heteronomous art geared towards mass consumption applies equally, 
for Adorno, to political art. In political art the consumer is to be led in a particular 
direction. Adorno rejects the very idea that art remains authentically aesthetic when it 
endeavours to represent empirical social reality as it thinks it actually is in order to 
educate its audiences in politics. Adorno regards social realism, for instance, as 
“crude propaganda” (AT 243). Social realism subverts art by turning it into an 
ideological vehicle. In that case the aesthetic process is heteronomous, not self-
determining (autonomous). 
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Autonomous artworks, then, are artifactual forms that do not generate familiar 
patterns of experiences. And this is because they are produced outside the space of 
familiarity. The autonomous quality is indeed more apparent the greater the difference 
between society and the aesthetic. Within an all encompassing social totality authentic 
art appears to be radically at odds with society. The forms of experience enabled by 
the autonomous work are not a matter of novelty. Rather, autonomous works enable 
experiences of social reality as it really is: i.e. a commodified reality, filled with 
useless junk. Kafka, Adorno claims, expresses in his work, the “waste-products” (P 
251) of society. His work is autonomous as it builds itself upon a reality in decay. It 
reproduces society negatively by expressing irrational social norms in a way that gives 
heightened perception to them. “Kafka’s power,” Adorno writes, “is that of a negative 
feel for reality” (AT 19). Non-autonomous art, by contrast, positively reproduces the 
norms of society: it takes society at face value, that is, as being the rational, freedom-
enabling entity it claims to be. 
 
Mimetic Comportment 
The various theses of Adorno that we have already discussed – autonomy and 
authenticity – have been met with considerable criticism.13 The essence of the various 
criticisms – an answer to which is important in the context of Adorno’s assessment of 
Kafka – is that Adorno offers a stipulative theory of art. He specifies, as we have 
seen, that art must be autonomous if it is to be authentic. It will be constituted by 
forms that separate it radically from conventional modalities of expression. 
Furthermore, he directly excludes realism as a genuine aesthetic form. Realism takes 
“reality” as its standard of aesthetic quality and it thereby places the criterion of art 
outside of art itself. But what is the basis of Adorno’s claim that art is compromised 
when guided by external considerations? Without a principle to support his exclusions 
(of realism, of political art, of popular art) Adorno’s position may indeed be 
vulnerable to the “stipulation” criticism. An answer is to be found, however, in his 
conception of mimetic comportment as a characteristic of autonomous art. 
 
The mimetic comportment of the artist means for Adorno unconstrained creativity. 
Adorno has a complex account of how the natural mimetic capacities of human beings 
have been damaged by the development of instrumental reason (the history of 
reification). Ideally mimesis is a capacity in which the individual gives herself over to 
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a process of uninhibited interaction with another. In that process experiences of what 
cannot be anticipated emerge. This capacity, however, is now found only in aesthetic 
activity (AT 331). It is not mimesis in its original form – interaction with another – but 
an attenuated variety which nevertheless involves a relinquishment of subjective 
control. Relinquishment does not mean passivity, however. The subject is involved in 
a series of decisions thrown up within the creative process itself as the problematic 
legacies of her recent tradition. The flow of creativity is a series of judgments about 
what – if anything – is required as the next step in the process. The norms of those 
judgments are aesthetic: they bear upon the history of art, though they are not guided 
by that history. And the act of judgment is mimetic: it is the act of a self not seeking 
to control or categorize, unlike the acts of non-aesthetic (reified) judgment. Rather, 
the subject, through mimetic comportment, adopts a behaviour towards her task in 
which she frees herself from any sense of what is expected of her. In Aesthetic Theory 
Adorno writes: “Only the autonomous self is able to turn critically against itself and 
break through its illusory imprisonment. This is not conceivable as long as the 
mimetic element is repressed by a rigid aesthetic superego” (AT 117). This is no 
demand for randomness or wild spirits. It is a process of evolving aesthetic 
judgments. We can see, therefore, how Adorno can speak of Arnold Schoenberg’s 
expressionistic work as “untrammelled, mimetic creation” (P 151). It is mimetic in 
that it refers to the surrendering of the decisionistic ego to the creative process, 
regardless of where the process goes. When art is controlled it loses its autonomy. If 
art is the activity of “the mimetic impulse” (AT 54) it follows, what Adorno refers 
frequently to as, a law of form. The law does not, he claims, “predominate” in 
artworks; “they are seldom planned” (AT 64). But a procedure that attempted to make 
randomness the form would be non-mimetic production in its abstention from the 
effort to develop the inner coherence of the work. That is, it would be guided by a 
principle that lay outside the aesthetic process. Mimetic comportment alone is, 
Adorno holds, fidelity to the aesthetic process itself. 
 
Through the mimetic process Kafka, Adorno claims, develops his distinctive form. 
Kafka’s works, according to Adorno, are “determined by their inner form” (P 265). 
This is evident by their inner coherence in which their narratives unfold “in time” (P 
247). It develops according to its immanent logic, thereby gaining its own specific 
integrity. Crucially, Kafka’s narratives do not follow any sequence the reader can 
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anticipate, yet they are not randomly constructed. Haphazardness could generate no 
coherence. Adorno, however (as we have seen), ascribes inner coherence to Kafka’s 
work. Mimetic productivity generates coherent works because it involves developing 
work through a process and unfolding sequence. A work designed with randomness as 
a principle would be heteronomous: its meaning would lie outside the work. Adorno’s 
claim here reflects the hierarchical place of expressionist works of art in his 
evaluation of contemporary art forms. This is the very quality he praises in Kafka. 
The expressionist path – Kafka’s “authentic horizon” (P 261) as it is Schoenberg’s, 
according to Adorno – is mimetic. It is a committed process of creativity in which the 
artist seeks to produce a determinable whole (which does not mean constructing a 
narrative that follows the classical rule about wholes). The notion of mimetic 
creativity, then, turns out to be the basis for what might otherwise appear to be 
stipulations within Adorno’s theory. If there is such a capacity and it bears the 
features Adorno describes – principally, the artistic individual relinquishing control – 
then the notion of authenticity as that which is produced without an agenda gains 
some ground. Needless to say, a deeper investigation of the concept of mimetic 
comportment than can be given here is required if Adorno’s conception of 
authenticity is to have more than prima facie plausibility. 
 
Realism 
In view of the connection Adorno draws between authenticity and autonomy, his 
claim that authentic work mimetically expresses social reality looks quite mysterious. 
How is it that free, uninhibited creation, pursing purely aesthetic objectives just so 
happens to be a mimesis of social reality? Why should it have that content and 
somehow encipher social reality? Adorno does not provide a sketched out theory of 
this relationship. The key to understanding this it, though, it seems to me, lies in a 
claim we have already seen. Namely, that art is a historical, non-metaphysical 
practice. The materials that it must use – social ideas, forms of life that influence 
experience – are historical in nature. But handling these materials aesthetically means 
presenting them aesthetically. As Adorno says of Kafka’s work: “Kafka sins against 
an ancient rule of the game by constructing art out of nothing but the refuse of reality” 
(P 251). His work expresses only experiences given by the social totality. When these 
experiences or materials are taken up by conventional forms of expression – mass 
entertainment, political art, social realism – they are simply reproduced. They are 
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mirrored, not illuminated. When they are the materials of authentic works of art, 
however, they are expressed in ways in which the truth of what they are is no longer 
occluded by the vehicle of their expressions. In this respect Kafka’s work, Adorno 
claims, stands against “an age when sound common sense only reinforces universal 
blindness” (P 254). His work opens up the possibility that we might actually 
experience the truth of what we take to be natural. The artwork, in this context, really 
does become a cipher of falsity (as we shall see in more detail below). As Adorno 
writes: “it may be said of Kafka that not verum but falsum is index sui” (P 247). 
 
Adorno’s position, then, is that, in spite of the apparent indifference of the artwork to 
social reality, its form – its logic – reveals the form of social reality. And it does so 
without any recourse to realism. If “social realists,” Adorno notes, “took reality 
seriously enough they would eventually realize what Lukács condemned when during 
the days of his imprisonment in Romania he is reported to have said that he had 
finally realized that Kafka was a realist writer” (AT 322). The “realism” of Kafka’s 
work, then, is its effective expression of the distinctive conditions of late capitalism, 
the period of the irrational social totality. In this period society is not only geared 
towards the production of commodities, but social life bears the characteristics of 
commodification.14 Hence, the aesthetic expresison of this is as Simon Jarvis writes, 
“a realism of the loss of experience.”15 Kafka never names the social totality, yet, as 
Adorno writes, no “world could be more homogeneous than the stifling one which 
[Kafka] compresses to a totality by means of petty-bourgeois dread; it is logically air-
tight and empty of meaning like every system” (P 256). The totality encompasses all 
behaviour and all interaction. It operates without justification since individuals who 
are constituted through it do not conceive it as unreasonable, unnecessary or 
unnatural. For them, it is the space within which they exercise their freedom. Kafka’s 
work is set within this totality, and it mimetically adopts the form of that totalized 
world. The logic of the totality, however, is false, as are the conventions of the worlds 
set out in Kafka’s novels. What gives those worlds their coherence is not their truth, 
but their sustained falseness. Adorno writes: “Kafka, in whose work monopoly 
capitalism appears only distantly, codifies in the dregs of the administered world what 
becomes of people under the total social spell more faithfully and powerfully than do 
any novels about corrupt industrial trusts” (AT 230). And he does so simply by 
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expressing society’s form: closed, unjustifiable, yet determining the lives of everyone 
within it. 
 
Mimesis, then, consists in expressing a world without reproducing it. It is not 
mirroring, but aesthetic expression. To express the world aesthetically is to imitate it 
aesthetically. Outside the space of the aesthetic, Adorno effectively says, there is 
simply the damaged experience of individuals adhering spontaneously to the 
imperatives of the social totality. But authentic art provides us with an entirely 
different relation to that experience: it is no longer undergone without a sense that 
there is something wrong. In the “mimesis” of social processes “a universal which has 
been repressed by sound common sense” becomes apparent (P 249): the universal and 
all pervasive social totality. Kafka’s works are negative not in any explicit “negation” 
of sociality reality, but rather in the sense that they express patterns of irrationality 
and unsettle the unthinking relationship we have with societal norms. Through these 
artworks we gain a heightened experiential appreciation of a reified world in which 
we are normally uncritically immersed. As a “mimesis of reification” (AT 230) 
Kafka’s work, according to Adorno, achieves this experiential expression of the 
problematic social totality. 
 
Adorno appraises the work of Baudelaire and of Beckett in similar terms. He says of 
Baudelaire that he “neither railed against nor portrayed reification; he protested 
against it in the experience of its archetypes, and the medium of this experience is the 
poetic form” (AT 21). And of Beckett: “This shabby, damaged world of images is the 
negative imprint of the administered world. To this extent Beckett is realistic” (AT 
31). However, he accords specifically to Kafka the capacity to expose what he sees as 
the mythic structure of society: its indefensible norms and conventions that are, 
nevertheless, uncritically lived. The myth of society, that it is a collection of free 
individuals voluntarily committed to it because it is consonant with their freedom and 
based on some kind of rational principles, is a powerful one. It is the narrative that 
bourgeois society gives to itself, and it frames the self-understanding of bourgeois 
individuals. Hence it is not just one myth among others: it is the foundational myth of 
capitalist society. But Kafka, Adorno writes, “convicts civilization and bourgeois 
individuation of their illusoriness” (P 251). Kafka’s mimetic presentation exposes the 
mythic nature of its binding yet arbitrary character. He presents us with reified 
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characters working within “the myth” in which we see “blind force endlessly 
reproducing itself” (P 260). Adorno maintains that Kafka’s narratives express the 
truth behind the self-understanding of modern individuality. Individuals are “the bare 
material existence that emerges in the subjective sphere through the total collapse of a 
submissive consciousness, divest of all self-assertion” (P 252). In reality the 
individual is not an agent. The social totality reproduces itself only when human 
beings have ceased to be its agents. Hence individuals have become the means by 
which the social totality reproduces itself: “The crucial moment, however, towards 
which everything in Kafka is directed, is that in which men become aware that they 
are not themselves – that they themselves: are things” (P 255). They are the material 
of the system, not its masters. 
 
Immanence 
Adorno considers the form of experience enabled by Kafka’s works as significant to 
the business of illuminating the essential character of society. His works puncture the 
illusion of a neutral social totality with no determinative power that is supposedly 
merely a form of social organization which pragmatically facilitates self-preservation. 
Kafka demystifies social experience in a purely negative way, that is, he does not 
indicate anything about a new world, free of reification. No utopia is offered in image. 
Adorno identifies this approach as Kafka’s literalness. His works “take everything 
literally; cover up nothing with concepts invoked from above” (P 247). However, this 
literalness has a productive negativity. It is what Adorno generally refers to as 
determinate negation. Kafka, Adorno claims, can define society “all the more 
precisely in its negative” (P 256). A determinate negation is knowledge bearing. This 
knowledge – in this context – has emancipatory potential in that it gives us a view of 
what our deepest beliefs (about society and our selves as individuals in it) actually 
commit us to doing. Conceiving of our impulsive identification with society as a 
neurosis, Adorno says of Kafka: “Instead of curing neurosis, he seeks in it itself the 
healing force, that of knowledge: the wounds with which, society brands the 
individual are seen by the latter as ciphers of the social untruth, as the negative of 
truth” (P 252). 
 
By admitting no concepts “from above” Kafka’s engagement with society is 
immanent. His consistent immanence gives exact – literal – expression to the nature 
13 
of the social totality. Kafka’s work, according to Adorno, “must renounce any claim 
to transcending myth, it makes the social web of delusion knowable in myth through 
the how, through language. In his writing, absurdity is as self-evident as it has 
actually become in society” (AT 230-31). Kafka’s works confirm that there are no 
normative sources beyond the institutions and conventions of the totality. The existing 
conventions predominate and, in the absence of any consciousness of alternatives take 
on the character of inevitability. Adorno writes: “The closed complex of immanence 
becomes concrete in the form of a flight from prisons. In the absence of contrast, the 
monstrous becomes the entire world, as in Sade, the norm, whereas the unreflective 
adventure novel, by concentrating on extraordinary events thus confirms the rule of 
the ordinary” (P 265). The purely immanent approach, then, disturbs the settled 
experiences of everydayness. 
 
Adorno confronts and criticizes rather generally the existentialist reading of Kafka 
with his own immanentist interpretation (P 244). Adorno presents existentialism as 
the recommendation that in an absurd universe human beings can do little but 
accommodate themselves to it. This accommodation means surrendering the notion 
that the world in which we live can be altered by our actions: we must therefore resign 
ourselves to the given rather than rail at our conditions. Faced with absurdity of our 
situation – our desire for agency and freedom on the one side and the non-
responsiveness of the universe on the other – “the only alternative” left to the 
individual by existentialism, according to Adorno, is that he does “his duty, humbly 
and without great aspirations, and to integrate himself into a collective which expects 
just this” (P 245). The existentialist reading, then, like Adorno’s interpretation, 
identifies Kafka’s immanentism: the notion that there is nothing outside the plane of 
given experience. Adorno argues, however, that existentialism entirely 
misunderstands the significance of immanence. Whereas the existentialist reading 
suggests that Kafka’s work is a protest against the yearning for happiness – Adorno he 
claims – it is for Adorno a revelation of – and implicitly a protest against – the 
conditions which constantly deny happiness. Adorno, we might say, ascribes a 
negative immanentism to Kafka: pure immanence implicitly speaks against a closed 
world. Existentialism, by contrast, frames Kafka’s worlds as positive immanence: 
they supposedly provide us with reasons to act in ways that ultimately embrace the 
world. 
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This negative immanentism interpretation also informs Adorno’s reading of the status 
of hope in Kafka’s work. He cites Kafka’s comment “that there is infinite hope except 
for us” (P 230-31). Adorno does not see this as metaphysical pessimism, as a 
statement about the intrinsic order of the universe (pace existentialism). It is not an 
effort to produce hopelessness. Adorno sees it, rather, as extinguishing false hope, i.e. 
the hope that our current arrangements are not irredeemable. A determinate negation 
of false hope, however, is the beginning of a way beyond those arrangements. As 
Adorno puts it: “If there is hope in Kafka’s work, it is in those extremes rather than in 
the milder phases: in the capacity to stand up to the worst by making it into language” 
(P 254). Although Adorno, as we have seen, holds that Kafka does not impose a 
personal philosophical conception of the world on his narratives, he finds a valuable 
interpretative aide in a comment from Kafka’s notebooks (Blue Octavo). He cites it to 
support the notion of a rejection of false hope in Kafka: “To believe in progress is to 
believe that there has not yet been any” (P 257). Adorno articulates the same idea as 
follows: “the name of history may not be spoken since what would truly be history, 
the other, has not yet begun” (P 257). Again, hope cannot be considered until we 
realize that there is now no basis for hope. This thesis resonates powerfully with 
Adorno’s own notion of history and progress: “no progress is to be assumed that 
would imply that humanity in general already existed and therefore could progress.”16 
The liberal faith in the progress of the West masks the deformation of human life and 
the ever closing systematization of our social arrangements. 
 
The immanentism of Kafka’s narratives is of particular significance to Adorno as it 
coincides with his own epistemological vantage point. Adorno advocates social 
criticism in the form of “immanent critique.” For criticism to be immanent means, 
according to Adorno, working to show the inherent contradictions of society without 
introducing standards of a good or better society from outside. There is, in any case, 
no “Archimedean position above culture and the blindness of society” (P 31). The 
social critic does not occupy a normative space that is somehow independent of 
existing society. In order then to avoid utopian irrelevancies or the delusion of purity, 
social criticism becomes immanent critique. Kafka achieves this in the great novels. 
Joseph K. and the land surveyor K. appear at first to be normal people thrown into 
unusual circumstances. The decisions they take in order to negotiate those 
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circumstances, however, end up integrating them within the very systems that seem at 
first to have no authority or justification. In this process the protagonists, in their 
attempts to reason their way within the system, actually give it an authority that 
eventually defeats them. As Adorno writes: “The heroes of the Trial and the Castle 
become guilty not through their guilt – they have none – but because they try to get 
justice on their side. … [T]heir sound reasoning strengthens the delusion against 
which it protests” (P 270). Their actions – perfectly consistent with the irrational 
norms of the system – are the actions of non-agents. Kafka’s narratives express the 
fall of the subject. As Adorno continues: “Through reification of the subject, 
demanded by the world in any event, Kafka seeks to beat the world at its own game” 
(P 270). Beating the world at its own game requires pressing the implications of what 
is required of the social actor to its limits. In this way, Adorno claims, Kafka’s writing 
works against “the untruth of the abstract utopia” (P 270). It is, in effect, social 
criticism that succeeds by an insistent immanence. 
 
Conclusion 
In Negative Dialectics Adorno suggests that Kafka may be the “apotheosis” of the 
self-reflection of philosophy that Adorno himself had attempted to stimulate and 
develop.17 Self-reflection is thought “thinking against itself,” guarding against its 
tendencies to construct, at the expense of the particularities of reality, abstractions and 
utopias. Those tendencies obscure what Kafka recognized as “the disturbed and 
damaged course of the world.”18 We have seen, from looking at “Notes on Kafka” and 
Aesthetic Theory, why Adorno finds in Kafka a deep affinity with his own 
philosophical project. Although Kafka does not engage in social criticism, his work is, 
for Adorno, a mimetic expression of society. It is historical and engaged with the 
materials of society. The immanence of Kafka’s mimeticism shatters our 
complacency about the everyday by expressing its essential form. Kafka 
demonstrates, according to Adorno, that “form is the locus of social content” (AT 
230). This principle transcends its aesthetic context and function. And it is the reason 
why Adorno does not conceive of Kafka’s work as a literary version of the 
philosophical programme of critical theory, but as providing vital foundational 
support for its deepest theoretical endeavours: that of elucidating the formal 
conditions of reified society. 
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